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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
PARLAN McFARLANE, also known as
PARLANE McFARLAND,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GLENN WINTERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELL~~

BRIEF

STATEMENT- OF THE CASE
The plaintiff and respondent brought this action in the
District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, to recover
from the defendant and appellant the sum of $2,299.25, together with interest thereon at the rate of S<fo per annum
from the 1st day of May, 1939, and plaintiff's costs. The
Complaint alleges that on the 1st day of May, 1939, the
plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant in the sum
of $1,381.40,
together
with
interest
in bythe
sumof Museum
of $905.00
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and costs in the sum of $17.80, making a total judgment of
$2,299.25, and that said sum had borne interest at the rate
of S% per annum from May 1, 1939 to May 1, 1947, when
the Complaint was filed, and for that amount judgment was
prayed. To that Complaint the defendant and appellant
answered in his first defense that the plaintiff in the action
was dead, and that he had been dead for more than twenty
years prior to the commencement of the action. In his second
defense he states that the action is barred by the provisions
of Sections 104-2-21 and 104-2-38 of the Utah Code Annotated
of 1943. For his third defense he pleads that on September
28, 1914 in case number 1050 between the same parties, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for the sum of $488.50, and that on September 7,
1922, an action was brought to renew the judgment and a
judgment was entered by default in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for the sum of $1380.40. He then
pleads that that judgment was void for the reason that the
defendant and appellant was never served with summons in
said action, and that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
defendant; that the Sheriff's return of said Summons stated
that he served it upon the defendant by leaving a copy of the
Summons with Mrs. W. P. Winters at Price, Utah, at the
usual place of abode of the defendant on September 15, 1922,
and he alleges that Price, Carbon County, Utah, was not and
never had been the usual place of abode of the defendant and
appellant, but that his usual place of abode at that time was
Sanpete County, State of Utah; that on May 1, 1939, the same
action was brounght in the court of Sanpete County for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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renewal of said judgment and wherein a judgment was obtained
for the sum of $2299.25, which the defendant alleges is a
void judgment by reason that the former judgment heretofore
referred to was void for lack of service of Summons, and the
defendant alleges that an attempt to renew the judgment in
the present action was void for the reason that the judgment
which was attempted to be renewed was void and of no force
and effect. The first judgment obtained for the sum of $488.50
was the result of an automobile collision in 1914 on September
28th. This being true, it is shown that this is the fourth time
the judgment has been sued upon for renewal. In the action
the plaintiff prays for judgment in the sum of $2299.25, together with interest at 8lfo from the 1st day of May 1939,
and the defendant prays in his Answer that the plaintiff take
nothing upon his said Complaint, but that the same be dismissed and that the defendant recover his costs.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The defendant and appellant appeals from the judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and respondent for the sum
of $2299.25, together with interest upon said sum, basing his
claim principally on the allegations of his first defense to the
effect that the plaintiff in the action is dead, and that he has
been dead for more than twenty years prior to the commencement of the action.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes the
following assignments of error upon which he will rely for
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1. The court erred in the computation of interest in the

entry of said judgment, it being shown that the first judgment
obtained against the defendant and appellant was the sum
of $488.50, and that when that judgment was renewed, it
was renewed for the principal sum, plus interest on said sum
at the legal rate during the time subsequent to the entry of the
first judgment. From that time on the record shows that the
interest has been compounded every time the judgment has
been renewed at least four times since the entry of the first
judgment, and that the greater portion of the judgment now
entered is a judgment for interest compounded upon interest.
2. The Court erred in denying the defendant and appel-

lant judgment in the trial of said action in the District Court
and in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and respondent in said action.
3. The court erred m denying defendant's motion for
new trial.

ARGUMENT
The evidence in this case shows in effect the following
facts:
That the plaintiff obtained a judgment in 1914 against
the defendant for the sum of $488.50, no part of this judgment has ever been paid. If it were to run at straight 8o/o
interest from the date of its entry to the present time, there
would be accumulated in interest the sum of $1328.72, add
the principal sum of $488.50 to that sum and it gives a total
of $1817.22. However, by compounding this interest every
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8 years and charging interest upon interest, a judgment in this
case, if there is a judgment in this case, has accumulated to the
sum of approximately $4,000.00. We say that such a procedure is not intended by our statute or justified thereby, and
should not be permitted to be carried through in the manner
applied by the court in this action.

We refer to Section 44-0-4 of the 1943 Annotated Code:
"Interest on Judgments. Any judgment rendered
on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties which shall
be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall
bear interest at the rate of B7o per annum." (Italics
ours.)
It is just a little difficult to conceive how, out of this
situation, one would attempt to compound his interest every
eight years when the judgment was renewed when the only
action taken on the matter was the renewal of the judgment.
One would hardly expect to take a note for six years at a
specified interest and then if the note were not paid before
the statute of limitation run upon it, and it was necessary to
renew it, that the party making the note would be expected
in that renewal to have the interest figured and added to the
principal and then make a new principal out of the combined
sum on a renewal note and have the entire combination then
bear interest again at the rate of B7o per annum. It would
appear to us that such a computation of interest would be a
usurious enterprise, and that fact is definitely established when
it is shown, as hereinabove, that a straight B7o interest on
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total amount due now at approximately $1817.22, when the
last judgment entered is for some $4,000.00, twice and onefourth the amount that the judgment should be.
We, therefore, submit that the court erred in rendering
judgment, as in this case rendered, for the amount specified
therein.
Assignment of error two goes to the important question in
this case and that is as to whether or not the evidence supported
the defendant's first defense that the plaintiff was dead and
had been dead for more than twenty years prior to the commencement of the action.
We wish to refer to the testimony in the transcript on
this particular point. Mrs. Anna C. McFarlane, a witness for
the plaintiff testified that she was the former wife of the
plaintiff in this action; that she last saw the plaintiff in 1921
(T. p. 11), and that she had never seen nor heard from him
since that time (T. p. 12); that she had received no written
communication from him, had received no telegrams, no
telephone conversations and no other word of any kind since
1921 (T. p. 13; that she thinks he left home when he did
leave because he was not contented, and because his family
was a burden ti him (T. p. 14); that if her husband were alive
now, he would be 63 years old; that he was born in 1884
(T. p. 15). She stated that his mother received a card from
him in 1941, a short time before his mother died; that she
did not see the card, but she saw the envelope it was in; that
she saw the handwriting on it, and it was the handwriting
of her husband, Parlan McFarlane; that the envelope had a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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California postmark on it (T. p. 18); that the envelope contained a lvfother's Day card, and that it was sometime in May
when she saw it (T. p. 19); that she did not see the card, but
she saw the envelope; that the envelope was laying on the
kitchen table in Mrs. Taylor's home in Manti (T. p. 20); that
she did not see the card, but the envelope looked as though
it had a card in it (T. p. 21); that she recognized the handwriting as that of her husband's (T. p. 22).
It will be noted that this envelope-on-the-table transaction
was twenty years after Farlan McFarlane had been gone and
no word had been received from him by his wife or family.

Wanda McFarlane Larsen testified that she was born
October 18, 1916, and that she does not remember her father
at all (T. p. 25).
William McFarlane testified that he was a brother of
Farlan McFarlane; that he had never seen him since he left
Manti in 1921 (T. p. 28); that the only thing he had ever
heard of him was that Bruce Axelson and Wilford Fishneck
had brought some communication to him regarding his
brother, Farlan McFarlane from California; that the mother
of these boys died in July of 1941; that at the time Farlan McFarlane did not attend the funeral, did not send any word
concerning the matter, in fact no word was received from him
at all (T. p. 29 and 30); that Wilford Fishneck had told him
that he had seen his brother in California in 1925, and that
Ezra Madson from Ephraim has seen Farlan McFarlane in
California in 1929 (T. p. 31). At that time he was running
a paint
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family about him; that he, William McFarlane, had been furnishing money to renew the judgments on this particular
lawsuit ever since the first judgment was entered in favor of
his brother, and that he had done so without any request or
suggestion from his brother, the plaintiff, whatsoever (T. p.
32); that he had in like manner renewed the judgment at
least three times and perhaps four (T. p. 33). He testified
that he had seen a card sent to his mother on Mother's Day
by his brother Farlan McFarlane; that he identified the card
by the handwriting on the envelope addressed to his mother
(T. p. 35); that he took care of his mother's correspondence
(T. p. 36). He stated that the envelope was dated, but the
card was not. There was nothing on the card; that he does
not know where the card is (T. p. 37); that the address on the
envelope was in his brother's handwriting; that he could tell
his brother's handwriting because, as he said, "I can write
and you can tell my handwriting anytime, and I can tell a
McFarlane handwriting." That there was some checks in
the possession of his wife signed by him, but no comparison
of those checks were made. (T. p. 38). That it was written
in indelible pencil, and that the only thing he noticed about
it was a postmark from California (T. p. 39).
Wilford Frischnecht, a witness for the plaintiff testified
that he saw Farlan McFarlane in Oakland, California in 1925
(T. p. 65).
Bruce Axelson testified that he saw Farlan McFarlane in
San Francisco in 1928 or 1929 (A. p. 66); that it was on Howard Street between 3rd or 4th; that he went down there to
get a bus on their way to Los Angeles, but he did not do much
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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talking to him, but that his brother did. He said he was
going on a paint job out at Palo Alto (T. p. 67); that on Cross
Examination, the witness testified that he knew Parlan Me~
Farlane as a young boy, but admi'tted that he left Manti when
the witness was but 8 years of age; that the last time he talked:
to him he asked if his mother was still alive and asked how
Bill was; that he first denied being Parlan McFarlane, qut
after talking to him a little while he asked if his mother was,
still alive, but he never stated who his mother was to wh_q!Jl
he was referring (T. p. 72).
. ""
A Louise Cox, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that she
thought she saw Parlan McFarlane last summer in Provo
(T. p. 73); that she and her daughter were walking up the
street in Provo and they saw a man whom they thought. was
Parlan McFarlane; that he had cotton on his eye and dark
glasses over the cotton; one eye being bandaged (T. p. 82 and,
83). That he did not recognize them, and the witness testified that she thought it was because he did not want to recognize them (T. p. 83 and 84).
As we view the testimony, the only testimony there is
of Parlan McFarlane being in existence within the statutory
period of the last eight years, is the fact, that certain people
saw an envelope laying on the table in his mother's home that
had a card on it that had no handwriting whatsoever; that it
had an address to his mother with a California postmark on it,
and the testimony of this Mrs. Cox who says she saw him in
Provo; that is the only testimony that seems to bring us within
the perview of the statutory period of seven years after which
a
person is presumed to be dead, and we do not believe that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the testimony is sufficient upon which to base a judgment,
certainly it would s'eem strange if the man Mrs. Cox saw in
Provo was him, that no relative in Utah saw him at that time,
and though she testified that the man was wearing working
clothes, indicating that he was employed in or around about
Provo, and then this mysterious card that these people saw
but no one could produce, although it must be remembered
that William McFarlane knew about this judgment and had
paid the costs of those renewals some three times up to that
time, and yet he did not feel that the card was of any importance or significance in establishing that his brother was still
alive. We do not believe that such evidence would
supply the burden of proof required of the plaintiff to support
a judgment in an action brought for that purpose.
In opposition to this slight evidence, we have the evidence
of the defendant, Glenn Winters, who testified that he had seen
Parlan McFarlane around the streets in Mount Pleasant; that
he was at the first trial of the case and saw him at that time;
that he had made an effort to locate Parlan McFarlane prior
to the last trial of this action ( T. p. 42) ; that he had inquired
of Will McFarlane and Mrs. McFarlane (Parlan McFarlane's
wife) ; that his wife had told him that she had last heard from
him in Salt Lake City; that he contacted the Police Department
of Salt Lake City, but that they could not find him; that he
had the bookkeeper of the Utah Power & Light Company
search their records back 2 5 to 26 years and they could find
nothing concerning Parlan McFarlane; that he had the telephone directory of Salt Lake City and the City Directory
searched (T. p. 43), also, the register of Vital Statistics; that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he had made inquiries in San Francisco and Ely, Nevada, and
other places; that he had directed letters be sent to practically
every County Seat west of Mississippi River, all that they
could find, and that they had written the Peace Officers in
all of those cities requesting that a search be made for him,
all of which was of no avail (T. p. 44); that he had <:ontacted
the Eastman Kodak people of San Francisco for the reason
that Farlan McFarlane was in the photography business in
Mount Pleasant; that of all the inquiries he made, he received
back only two replies which were marked Exhibits "A" and
"B" and are part of the record; that he had. a search made
through the United Mine Workers of America through their
Welfare Department, but could find no trace of him (T. p. 46);
that he has three cousins in San Francisco, and he had them
make a search of San Francisco to see if they could locate him,
and they could find no trace of him in San Francisco T. p. 47).
We, therefore, submit that the evidence in this case shows
that Farlan McFarlane, plaintiff, is, as a matter of law, dead,
and that he did not authorize any one nor did anyone have
any right to bring this action on his behalf.
Concerning the legal proposition that absence creates a pre~
sumption of death, we refer to the following authorities:
17 Corpus Juris, 1166, which reads as follows:
"The presumption of the continuance of life is
overcome or displaced by the presumption of death
which arises from the unexplained absence from the
person from his last or usual place of residence for a
sufficiently long period of time without having been
heard of during such period . . . The presumption
ofQuinney
death
fromFunding
unexplained
absence
is not,
however,
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a presumption of law, but a mixed presumption of law
and fact which may be rebutted, and it will not be
indulged where the circumstances of the cast are such
to account for· the absence of the person without assuming his death, and it has been held that he who
relies upon an unexplained absence must not only
prove it, but must also produce evidence to justify
the inference that death is the probable reason why
nothing is known about the missing persor; "
Concerning the length of absence, we quote from 17
Corp, Juris 1167:
"At common law the rule was that a presumption
of death arose from an unexplained absence of seven
years, and this is the rule which prevails in nearly all
jurisdictions, although in a few jurisdiction:; a shorter
period has been prescribed by statute."
Quoting now from Jones Commentaries of Evidence
Vol. 1, page 473, we have the following:
"It is thus stated in the Massachusetts case, that if
a man leaves his home and goes into parts unknown and
remains unheard from for the space of 7 years, the
law authorizes to those that remain, the presumption
of fact that he is dead, but it does not authorize him
to presume therefore that any one of those remaining
in the place which he left has died."
Again on page 476, we have the following:
"It need hardly be added that this pre~urnption of
death from absence is not a conclusive pcesumpt10n.
It is one of fact, and is subject to be controlled by the
facts of the case. It is one which varies in weight a('cording to the circumstances. The presumption may
be rebutted in the same manner as any other presumption of fact by proof of circumstances which are inconsistant with its existence as a logical conclusion."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Of course, there is nothing in this case that will meet such
a situation.
Again on page 477 of the same volume:
"Evidence having been adduced sufficient to create
a presumption of death from absence of the missing
person for seven years or more, unaccompanied by chcumstances accounting for such absence on any
hypothesis other than death, the burden of rebutting
such presumption devolves upon the party asserting
the continuance of life ... but it is not rebuttable on
mere rumor, it must be evidence of a tangible nature
such as a declaration of an intention to leave the horne
for some good reason ... It may be that if the eviden~e
here offered had been admitted (a general report
among the absentee's friends that he was living) tl1e
eros examination would have shown it to be mere vague
rumor, and if so, unworthy of credit, but if there was
such report and intelligence as to the absent man among
his friends and former acquaintances as was offered to
be shown, the weight to be given it was for the jury."
In the case of St. Martin vs. Hendershott, an Oregon case,
160 Pac. 373 at page 374:
''Isaac Arquette, so far as known, had no lineal
descendents, and since he has not been heard from by
his acquaintances or any member of his family for
more than seven years, he is therefore presumed to be
dead.''
ln the case of American National Insurance Company
vs. Hattie Hicks, 75 A.L.R. 623, quoting from the syllabus,
we have the following:
"Where, while a life insurance policy was in force,
the insured, whose family relations were happy and
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again heard from, the trial court in an action broughL
after the expiration of seven years has created a pn.~
sumption of death is warranted in fi.ndmg that the
death occurred before the policy had lapsed by reason
of non-payment of premiums."
And then quoting from the decision at page 629, we have
the following:
"The fact that death after an absence of seven year.:,
successively, by a person is fixed by the statute when
the fact of absence is established as was done in th1s
case, but the time of death of such individual must be
determined by the jury or by the court in trying tbe
case without the intervention of a jury." Soverign
Camp W. 0. W. vs. Boden, 117 Texas 229; 1 SW
(2nd) 256; 61 AIR 682.
In the case of Kansas City Life Insurance Company vs.
Dora Marshall, 61 A.L.R. 1321, quoting from the syllabus,
we have the following:
"The death of an unheard of absentee may likely
be presumed from evidence of facts and circumstances
other than those showing exposure to danger which
probably resulted or might probably have resulted
in his death without regard to the duration of the
absence, and that some time before the expiration of
the seven year period."
Again in the case of Lulu L. Goodier vs. Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York, 34 A. L. R. 1383, quoting
from the syllabus, we have the following:
"The presumption of continued life of one who has
disappeared from his home and the knowledge of
his family, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
continues for seven years. At the end of that time
and not until then it ceases to operate, and the preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sumption of death takes its place. The latter pre·
sumption is to the effect only that the missing one is not
then alive and does not prove death at any precise
time within the seven year period."
Quoting from the case at page 1387, we have the followrng:

"The presumption of death attending disappearance
followed by 7 year's absence with no tidings of the
missing one and no evidence that he has been seen
alive during that period, does not help plaintiff. The
presumption cannot be permitted to show death at any
time within the 7 year period. It comes into operation
at the end of 7 years absence simply as a logical substitution for the presumption of continued life which
at that moment ceases to operate. Certainly the inference of death after seven years cannot by itself
prove death before that time. The rule of the presumption extends merely to the fact that death from
and after the end of the period. It is not understood
to specify anything further-for example the time of
death within that period." Wigmore ev. Section 2531:
·'Where, in a note the authorities are gone into at
length. (The irreconcible conflict of authority as to
whether or not the presumption of death from absence
raises any presumption as to the precise time of death
is dealt with in the annotation of Butler vs. Supreme
Court, 53 Washington 118, 101 Pac. 481.)
In the case of Benjamin vs. District Grand Lodge So. 4,
Independent Order B'nai B'Rith, 152 Pac. 731, again quoting
from the syllabus:
"Where to prove the fact of insured's death, the
presumption under Code of Civil Procedure, Section
1963, subdivision 26, that a person not heard from in
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is Technology
dead, must
be relied
on.
The cause of
seven
Libraryyears
Services and
Act, administered
by the Utah
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
action on the benefit certificate providing for payment
on satisfactory evidence of his death does not arise
until lapse of such time."
In the case of the Praetorians vs. Phillips, 88 Pac. 2nd
647 at 650, we have the following:
"It will thus be seen that the general rule is that
where a person disappears and is not heard from for
a period of seven years, upon a showing of due diligence, search and inquiry, it will be presumed that
he is dead. This alone, however, will not give rise
to a presumption that such person died prior to the
last day of said 7 year period or at any particular time
within said period."

In the case of Fink vs. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, 90 Pac. 2nd, at page 762, quoting from syllabus No.
6, we have the following:
"Disputable presumption enumerated in statute that
one not heard from in 7 years is dead was not intended
to create new rule concerning effect of 7 years unexplained absence, but was merely intended to state
the existing law.
Syllabus No. 7:
"The rule permitting inference of death from 7
years unexplained absence is a rule of necessity.
Syllabus No. 9:
"In absence of special circumstances such as old age,
search and inquiry promptly instituted and prosecuted
with reasonable diligence are requisites to a presumption of death rule.
There can be no question at all concerning the presumption of death of a party who has been absent and unheard of
for the 7 year period, and there too can be no question of a
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party's right to proceed in cases such as the case at bar on such
a presumption.
Let us not lose track of the situation in this case under
which the plaintiff left his home, his wife and his family.
The evidence does not show that there was any family trouble
that had existed between him and his wife prior to his leaving
home, no more than ordinary difficulties that arise in any
home where the marital relations exist and are operating. The
evidence shows that the plaintiff in this action did not leave
home because of any trouble with his wife or family, but left
his home in quest of a job and never returned. Viewing the
evidence we have referred to as being the evidence introduced
at the trial of this case of a continued life of the plaintiff, it
seems inconceivable that a man would leave his family consisting of a wife and several small children on the pretext of
going to find employment and then never contacting them
again either by visit, correspondence or in any other manner for
a period of more than 25 years, and then to address a Mother's
Day card to his mother, under the cimcumstances attending
such sending of such card as divulged by the evidence, a plain
card in an envelope without a word of writing upon it to his
mother with whom he had had no difficulty whatsoever, addressing it to her merely as "Mrs." and eliminating her first
name, with no return address upon it, such procedure seems
absolutely unexplainable, and particularly the identification on
the pencilled writing on the envelope by a man who had aged
from 25 to 30 years since anyone of them had seen him or seen
his handwriting, and then the absence of the document in
evidence
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that the brother who has carried on the litigation over all these
long years testified that he saw the envelope and recognized
his brother's handwritng thereupon, and yet he does not pr~·
serve such evidence to present at the trial of the case to show
that the presumption of death through the absence of his
brother is untrue, and the evidence of Mrs. Cox who saw the
man with the bandaged eye at Provo and testified that it was
Parlan McFarlane and who was within three feet of him
when she saw him and yet she did not stop him and he did
not recognize her and she was never able to catch up to him
to determine definitely his identity and yet he did not run, he
walked up the street from the time she first saw him. It would
seem inconceivable if the man she saw was Parlan McFarlane,
and let us not lose track of the fact that he evidently was in
working clothes indicating that he was employed at or near
Provo, Utah, and yet with all of his friends and relatives so
near to where he was, not one other person ever saw him even
though may of these people were his relatives, and his wife
and children were still in Sanpete County, living there. This
being the only evidence the plaintiff has to overcome the presumption of his death, we cannot understand how such evidence
could be received to overcome the presumption as we understand the rule to be that a presumption takes substantial evidence to overcome it.
We then have the testimony of the defendant wherein it
shows that he extended great effort by personal inquiry, by innumerable letters sent out and some to acquaintances in San
Francisco who was acquainted with the plaintiff and who made
a diligent search in San Francisco, but was unable to locate
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him. His evidence of inquiry is substantial as against faint
presumption upon the part of the plaintiff.

We submit, therefore, that the court erred in granting
judgment for the plaintiff in this case, and that the judgment
so entered should be, by this court, reversed and 1:emanded to
the District Court of Sanpete County, with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the defendant-no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
E. LeROY SHIELDS
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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